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INTRODUCTION 
 On Wednesday, June 30, 2010, Senator Tom Coburn asked Supreme Court nominee Elena 
Kagan a simple but important question during her Senate confirmation hearings.  Sen. Coburn 
asked Ms. Kagan whether or not a law requiring every American to eat three vegetables and 
three fruits every day would violate the Commerce Clause. 
 Ms. Kagan refused to directly answer Sen. Coburn’s question.  However, Plaintiffs’ instant 
constitutional claims against the Individual Mandate require this Court, and eventually the 
Supreme Court upon which Ms. Kagan will likely serve as an Associate Justice, to finally and 
completely answer Sen. Coburn’s question.  If Congress has the power under the Commerce 
Clause as extended by the Necessary and Proper Clause to require citizens and legal residents to 
purchase private health care insurance from private for-profit corporations as Defendants 
contend, then Congress has the power to command an individual to purchase (and possibly 
consume) fruits and vegetables on pain of federal sanction.  Under such a radical interpretation 
of congressional authority, Americans are no longer free to refrain from any commercial 
purchase deemed necessary to effectuate a broad scheme directed at regulating any component of 
interstate commerce.  On its face, such a prospect is laughable.  In practice, it proclaims Liberty, 
heretofore understood by every living American, at an end. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590 (hereinafter the “Act”) requires 
all citizens and legal residents of the United States to purchase a minimum level of health care 
insurance, as determined by the federal government, starting in January, 2014 (hereinafter the 
“Individual Mandate”). 
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 Plaintiffs dropped their 80/20 health care coverage in 2001 because the monthly payments 
for a family of four grew to exceed their monthly mortgage payments.  Compl. ¶ 41.   By 2001 
Plaintiffs’ monthly health care insurance bill amounted to over $1,200.00 per month for health 
care insurance which is typically considered as merely “major medical” coverage for 
catastrophic illness.  Compl. ¶ 41.  After dropping their health care coverage, Plaintiffs have 
incurred health care costs and have been able to satisfy their financial obligations.  Compl. ¶ 43. 
 Plaintiffs are citizens and legal residents of the United States. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 37.   Plaintiff 
Barbara Goudy-Bachman is 48 years of age, does not qualify for Medicaid and will not qualify 
for Medicare before January 1, 2014.  Compl. ¶ 35.  Plaintiff Gregory Bachman is 56 years of 
age, does not qualify for Medicaid and will not qualify for Medicare before January 1, 2014.  
Compl. ¶ 36.   Plaintiffs are self-employed entrepreneurs who do not, and will not, receive health 
care insurance coverage from an employer.  Compl. ¶ 38. 
 After President Obama signed the Act into law, Plaintiffs, who were shopping for a new car, 
determined that because of the Individual Mandate, they could not afford to enter into long-term 
financing for a suitable new car because the monthly payments for such a car loan would extend 
past the effective start date of the Individual Mandate.  Compl. ¶ 44.  Plaintiffs determined that 
they could not afford to make both a car payment and payments required under the Individual 
Mandate at the back end of any new car financing plan starting in January, 2014.  Plaintiffs’ 
present ability to purchase a suitable new car of their choice is impaired by the requirements 
imposed by the Individual Mandate.  As law abiding citizens, Plaintiffs intend to comply with 
the Individual Mandate.  Compl. ¶ 45. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 Plaintiffs have standing, and their claims are ripe for adjudication, because the Individual 
Mandate impairs Plaintiffs’ present ability to enter into long-term financing for a suitable new 
car of their choice.  Long term financing for a new car typically extends five (5) years from the 
purchase of a new car.  The Individual Mandate imposes substantial additional financial 
responsibilities on Plaintiffs in the fourth year of any five year car loan.  Plaintiffs cannot 
presently afford a suitable new car of their choice without entering into a five year car loan.  
Plaintiffs cannot presently afford to make monthly payments both on a new car loan and for the 
minimum health care insurance required by the Individual Mandate starting in January, 2014. 
 The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution has never been extended, by any 
court, to permit Congress to regulate non-conduct.  An individual sitting in his home is not 
engaged in any conduct whatsoever, let alone economic conduct having an impact on interstate 
commerce necessary to trigger congressional regulatory power under traditional Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.  Through the Commerce Clause, Congress now seeks to regulate 
individuals not engaged in any economic conduct and extend its Commerce Clause power into a 
general police power with the authority to require citizens and legal residents to purchase a 
private commercial service and/or product merely because they exist and draw breath within the 
United States. 
 The Necessary and Proper Clause has never been recognized to extend congressional reach to 
individuals who have not engaged in conduct intersecting with an enumerated constitutional 
power.  Furthermore, the Individual Mandate fails the five part test recently announced by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Comstock to determine if a congressional regulation is 
permissible under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
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 The Anti-Injunction Act does not bar Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the Individual 
Mandate because the Individual Mandate does not purport to implicate the federal government’s 
ability to assess and collect taxes.  Similarly, the Individual Mandate is not a valid exercise of 
congressional authority pursuant to the General Welfare Clause of the Constitution because it is 
not a taxing or spending provision. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
 The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the allegations contained 
in the complaint.  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3rd Cir. 1993).  In Kost, the Third Circuit 
held that complaints need only set forth sufficient information to: 1) outline the elements of a 
claim; or 2) allow inferences to be drawn which support the existence of the elements of a claim.  
Id.  Thus in reviewing a motion to dismiss, this Court must accept “as true the facts alleged in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.”  Unger v. National 
Residence Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1394-95 (3rd Cir. 1991); see also Rocks v. 
Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644 (3rd Cir. 1989); Labalokie v. Capitol Area Intermediate Unit, 926 
F.Supp. 503, 506 (M.D. Pa. 1996). 
 Under Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ Complaint must be construed in 
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs that permit Plaintiffs to show any set of circumstances 
which, if true, would entitle Plaintiffs to the relief requested.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Gibbs v. 
Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 86 (3rd Cir. 1997) (citing Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3rd Cir. 1996)).  
Plaintiffs’ Complaint need only provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief.” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the …claim is 
and the grounds upon which is rests.”  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).  Factual 
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allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.  See C. Wright & 
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004). 
 Plaintiffs’ Complaint satisfies the pleading and legal sufficiency requirements of Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the dictates of federal decisional law.  
ARGUMENT 
I.  THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS 
 A.  Plaintiffs Have Standing To Maintain Instant Action. 
  The essence of any inquiry as to the standing of any litigant to challenge the 
constitutionality of any government action is whether the party seeking to invoke a court’s 
jurisdiction has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to assure the 
concrete adverseness that sharpens the presentation of issues upon which a court largely depends 
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.  Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study 
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 57 (1978).   
 The Constitution confines federal courts to the adjudication of actual cases and controversies.  
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). An actual case or 
controversy exists when a plaintiff has demonstrated an “injury in fact” causally connected to the 
challenged conduct which is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” and not 
merely “conjectural or hypothetical.”  Further, it must be “‘likely’ as opposed to merely 
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”  Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 
U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)).  “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting 
from the defendants conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss, we ‘presume that general 
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allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’”  Lujan at 561 
(quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)). 
  1. Plaintiffs Have Suffered “Injury-In-Fact” 
   a. Plaintiffs’ Economic Injury 
 Economic injury resulting from “regulation forbidden under the Commerce Clause satisfy the 
standing requirements of Article III.”  General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997); see 
also, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 267 (1984).  “An economic injury which is 
traceable to the challenged [government] action satisfies the requirements of Article III” 
standing.  Jet Courier Services, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 713 F.2d 1221, 1225-26 
(6th Cir. 1983).   
 Economic injury resulting from a government mandate satisfies Article III standing 
requirements.  In Linton v. Commissioner of Health & Env’t, 973 F.2d 1311 (6th Cir. 1992), the 
court held Article III standing requirements were satisfied where the plaintiff challenged a 
government Medicaid regulation that precluded plaintiff from voluntarily terminating their 
participation in the Medicaid program and mandated the plaintiff allocate a certain number of  
nursing home beds to Medicaid residents.  Id. at 1317.  The mandate denied plaintiff the right to 
allocate Medicaid patient beds to non-Medicaid residents financially capable of paying higher 
occupancy rates causing plaintiff’s economic injury sufficient to clear the Article III standing 
hurdle.  Id. 
 While plaintiffs are not in the nursing home business, the Individual Mandate decreases 
Plaintiffs’ disposable income; prohibits Plaintiffs from voluntarily declining the purchase of 
health care insurance from private commercial interests; and forbids Plaintiffs from dedicating a 
significant proportion of their disposable income toward other economic purposes.  Plaintiffs 
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have standing to litigate their constitutional claims because the Individual Mandate impairs their 
present ability to enter into long-term financing for consumer goods where monthly payments for 
such financing extend beyond the effective start date of the Individual Mandate.  Starting in 
January, 2014, Plaintiffs are forced to dedicate their disposable income toward compliance with 
the costs associated with the Individual Mandate – costs which total, for a family of four, at 
minimum, over $1,000 per month.  As a sole consequence of the presently known costs 
associated with Plaintiffs’ intended compliance with the Individual Mandate, Plaintiffs’ 
disposable income starting in January, 2014 is reduced (and probably completely eliminated) to 
the point that Plaintiffs know that they cannot presently afford to enter into a financing contract 
for a suitable new car of their choice that they otherwise intended to purchase.  Plaintiffs are 
suffering current economic injury as a direct and proximate result of the Individual Mandate. 
 Even placing the impairment of Plaintiffs’ economic right to enter into long-term financing 
for consumer goods to the side (an impairment which continues to grow to incorporate an ever 
larger number of economic transactions as 2014 approaches), the significant and certain financial 
threat posed to Plaintiffs by the looming Individual Mandate is sufficient to establish Plaintiffs’ 
standing by its own force.  Unless stricken by the courts, Plaintiffs and every American citizen 
and legal resident who does not have health care coverage provided by an employer or some 
other entity, must, at some point between now and January, 2014, rearrange their financial affairs 
to accommodate the significant financial requirements imposed on them by the Individual 
Mandate.  The Individual Mandate is federal law, no further regulation must be promulgated by 
Defendants for Plaintiffs to ascertain the certainty that starting January, 2014, a significant 
fraction (or majority) of their income must be dedicated to satisfy the onerous requirements of 
the Individual Mandate.  Plaintiffs must either take steps to increase their income or curtail other 
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spending now and in the future to fulfill the Individual Mandate’s required economic tribute to 
private insurance companies starting in 2014.  A regulation which “sets a standard of conduct for 
all to whom its terms apply…operates as such in advance of the imposition of sanctions upon 
any particular individual.”  Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 
(1942).  
   b. Plaintiffs’ Non-Economic Injury 
 Standing is not confined to those who demonstrate economic harm.  “Aesthetic and 
environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of 
life in our society” and are “deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.”  Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).  In the instant case, Plaintiffs’ actual and direct 
economic injury of not being able to enter into long-term financing contract to purchase a new 
car also establishes a cognizable non-economic injury sufficient to independently establish 
Article III standing.   
 A plaintiff challenging government conduct which impairs actual use and enjoyment of 
property “has standing to challenge the impermissible activity.”  Hawley v. City of Cleveland, 
773 F.2d 736, 740 (6th Cir. 1985); see also, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-88 
(1973); ACLU v. Rabun County, 698 F.2d 1098, 1108 (11th Cir. 1983).  As a direct result of the 
Individual Mandate being signed into law on March 23, 2010, Plaintiffs have been denied the use 
and enjoyment of a suitable new car they otherwise would have purchased – a use and enjoyment 
they are accustomed to as a result of new car purchases made by Plaintiffs in the past.  Plaintiffs 
are certain that this Court is in a position to take judicial notice of the benefits, both utilitarian 
and aesthetic, of the purchase of a new car of ones choice versus a less desirable new car, a used 
car or no car at all. 
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  2. Plaintiffs’ Injury is Directly Attributable to the Individual Mandate. 
 The Individual Mandate is the sole cause of Plaintiffs’ economic and non-economic injury.  
Defendants’ brief in support of their motion to dismiss make no attempt to dispute this prong of 
standing analysis. 
  3. Plaintiffs’ Injury is Likely to be Redressed by the Requested Relief 
 Declaratory and injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs will void the legal requirements 
imposed by the Individual Mandate and permit Plaintiffs to enter into long-term financing 
contracts for, and enjoy the use of consumer goods based on Plaintiffs’ disposable income 
unencumbered by the Individual Mandate.  Further, the requested relief will relieve Plaintiffs’ 
need to alter their financial affairs to accommodate the significant financial requirements 
imposed on them by the Individual Mandate.  Accordingly, the requested relief will redress 
Plaintiffs’ economic and non-economic injuries. 
 B.  Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims Are Ripe For Adjudication. 
  1. Plaintiffs’ Injuries Have Occurred 
 The ripeness doctrine seeks to separate matters that are premature for review because the 
injury is speculative and may never occur, from those cases that are appropriate for immediate 
judicial review.  Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).  There is an obvious overlap 
between the doctrines of standing and ripeness.  If no injury has occurred, the plaintiff might, in 
the first instance, be properly denied standing versus application of the ripeness doctrine that the 
injury is sufficiently plead, but had not yet occurred.  See generally, O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 
U.S. 488, 489 (1974).  At bottom, the doctrine of ripeness is focused not on the quality of the 
injury but on the simple analysis as to whether the injury has yet occurred. 
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 As applied to this instant action, Plaintiffs’ injury has occurred.  As a direct and sole 
consequence of the Individual Mandate, Plaintiffs cannot presently enter into long-term 
financing contracts for major consumer products, whose monthly payments extend beyond 
January, 2014.  As a result, Plaintiffs are presently deprived of the use and enjoyment of a 
suitable new automobile that Plaintiffs would have otherwise purchased had the Individual 
Mandate not been signed into law on March 23, 2010.  See Abbott Labs at 152-53. 
 “When the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain individuals is patent, it is 
irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy that there will be a time delay before the 
disputed provision will come into effect.”  Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 
102, 143 (1942).  “One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain 
preventative relief.  If the injury is certainly impending that is enough.”  Pennsylvania v. West 
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923). 
 Any continuing and future injury is inevitable.  In fact, the injury sustained by Plaintiffs and 
every other citizen and resident subject to the requirements of the Individual Mandate will grow 
with time – and become more evident to a larger proportion of the public – as the number of 
commercial purchases impacted by the costs associated with the Individual Mandate grow.  It is 
inevitable that in order to comply with the Individual Mandate the ability of many citizens to 
make immediate purchases of essential goods and services will be impaired or curtailed.  
  2. Factual Development is Complete – Decision on the Merits Solely Legal 
 A constitutional challenge is ripe for adjudication where the issues presented are “purely 
legal, and would not be clarified by further factual development.”  Abbott Labs at 149.  
Commerce Clause challenges are ripe for review because such cases present purely legal issues.  
Pic-A-State PA, Inc. v. Reno,76 F.3d 1294 (1996).  
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 No further factual development is necessary to clarify the constitutional issues implicated by 
Plaintiffs’ claims.  The issue as to whether or not Congress has the constitutional authority to 
force every American citizen and legal resident to purchase qualifying health care coverage from 
private insurance companies will be decided as a matter of law.  The Individual Mandate is 
federal law.  Plaintiffs’ legal requirement to purchase qualifying health care coverage from 
private insurance companies is not dependent on any future government action, whether 
legislative or administrative.  
 Further, the facts necessary to establish Plaintiffs’ standing to maintain the instant action are 
concrete and not hypothetical.  Plaintiffs sought to purchase a suitable new automobile.  After 
the Individual Mandate was signed into law on March 23, 2010, Plaintiffs determined they could 
not afford the new car they wanted to purchase because the costs associated with the Individual 
Mandate prevented them from being able to afford the monthly payments on financing for the 
desired new car once the Individual Mandate goes into effect on January, 2014.  Further, the 
significant cost of purchasing minimum health care coverage for a family of four is not 
hypothetical – such costs are documented, ascertainable through discovery, and known to 
Plaintiffs through prior experience.  Plaintiffs properly, and responsibly, acted on that knowledge 
in determining the Individual Mandate precluded them from entering into a five year financing 
contract for a new car of their choice. 
 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are ripe for adjudication. 
II.  THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT DOES NOT BAR FEDERAL JUDICIAL  
  REVIEW OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS. 
 
 Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the Individual Mandate is 
barred by operation of the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), is flawed both on the face of 
the statute and by clear precedent.  Section 7421(a) of the Anti-Injunction Act provides, in 
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relevant part that: “…no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any 
tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person 
against whom such tax was assessed.”   As stated by the United States Supreme Court, “[t]he 
object of §7421(a) is to withdraw jurisdiction from the state and federal courts to entertain suits 
seeking injunctions prohibiting the collection of federal taxes.”  Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 
370 U.S. 1, 5 (1962).  The Court further explained that:  
[t]he manifest purpose of §7421(a) is to permit the United States to assess and collect 
taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention, and to require that the legal right to 
the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund.  In this manner the United States is 
assured of prompt collection of its lawful revenue.   
 
Id. at 7. 
 
 The analysis used by the courts to apply the Anti-Injunction Act is as simple and 
unambiguous as the text of the statute.  The Anti-Injunction Act bars an action if “[t]hose 
proceedings are directly involved with the assessment and collection of taxes from appellant and 
those making contributions to it.”  Commonwealth Dev. Ass’n of Pennsylvania v. United States, 
365 F.Supp. 792, 795 (M.D. Pa. 1973).  
 Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge is confined to the Individual Mandate.  The Individual 
Mandate is not a tax and does not authorize the United States to “assess and collect” any lawful 
tax.  Enochs at 7.  The Individual Mandate merely imposes upon Plaintiffs the legal obligation to 
purchase, with Plaintiffs’ own funds, a minimum level of health care insurance from a private 
company starting in January, 2014.  The Individual Mandate does not implicate any transfer of 
funds between Plaintiffs (or any other citizen) and the federal government.  Any penalty that 
might be assessed is only triggered upon a failure to comply with the Individual Mandate and is 
contained in a separate provision of the Act not challenged by Plaintiffs in this action. 
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 In fact, Plaintiffs’ standing is premised on the fact that Plaintiffs are law abiding citizens 
whose intended compliance with the Individual Mandate impairs their present ability to enter 
into long-term financing for a suitable new car of their choice.  It is the required payment of 
anywhere between several hundred to over a thousand dollars per month that compliance with 
the Individual Mandate starting in 2014 impairs Plaintiffs’ present ability to enter into long-term 
financing for a suitable new automobile of their choice – not any penalty that might be imposed 
under other provisions of the Act.   
 In Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974), plaintiff sued to enjoin the IRS’s 
denial of tax-exempt status based on the school’s alleged racially discriminatory policies as 
violating the school’s First Amendment rights to association, free exercise of religion and to due 
process and the equal protection of the laws.  The Court in Bob Jones rejected petitioner’s 
contention that the action was not “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of 
any tax” because the petitioner’s “complaint and supporting documents…belie any notion that 
this is not a suit to enjoin the assessment or collection of federal taxes from petitioner….In 
support of its claim of irreparable injury, petitioner alleged in part that it would be subject to 
‘substantial’ federal income tax liability if the Service were allowed to carry out its threatened 
action.”  Id. at 738.  Contrary to the petitioner in Bob Jones, Plaintiffs in the instant action 
specifically aver that they intend to comply with the Individual Mandate and make no allegation 
that the outcome of this lawsuit (win or lose) will have any impact on taxes owed to the federal 
government.   
 Defendants seek to have this Court extend what the Supreme Court has stated is the 
“explicit” text of the Anti-Injunction Act to bar all federal judicial review of the constitutionality 
of any federal law to which Congress has attached a financial penalty for non-compliance.  See 
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id. at 736.  Under Defendants’ bizarre new world of the Constitution, a law passed by Congress 
which prohibited certain speech upon pain of a financial penalty could not be challenged under 
the Anti-Injunction Act until after a putative plaintiff violated the law, paid a fine and challenged 
the law through a refund action filed, in the first instance, with the administrative organs of the 
IRS.  On such facts, Defendants would have this court sweep aside and ignore long-standing 
precedent which grants standing to challenge government action impairing First Amendment 
rights prior to enforcement.  Further, such an extended reading of the Anti-Injunction Act would 
directly conflict with Supreme Court jurisprudence guaranteeing §1983 litigants the right to 
federal judicial review without requiring them to exhaust, or even resort to, state administrative 
remedies before filing a civil rights action in federal court.  See e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167, 183 (1961).  No court has ever interpreted the Anti-Injunction Act so broadly.  No court has 
ever applied the Anti-Injunction Act to bar a constitutional challenge to the exercise of 
congressional power in a non-tax case. 
 The Individual Mandate is not a tax.  This is not a tax case.  The Anti-Injunction Act simply 
does not apply to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. 
III.  CONGRESS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
  BY ENACTING THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE OF THE ACT  
   
 A.  Congress Exceeded Its Authority Under The “Commerce Clause” Of The 
   Constitution By Enacting The Individual Mandate Of The Act. 
 
 The Individual Mandate of the Act forces Plaintiffs to purchase a minimum level of health 
care insurance, as determined by the federal government, from private, for-profit insurance 
providers, under penalty of federal law.  Congress cites its power to regulate interstate commerce 
under the Commerce Clause as constitutional authority for the Individual Mandate. 
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 For the first time in its history, Congress seeks to extend the Commerce Clause as authority 
to regulate a citizen or legal resident living within the United States for the sole reason that they 
have chosen not to engage in any conduct whatsoever – let alone economic conduct necessary 
for Commerce Clause jurisdiction.  If the Commerce Clause, or any other provision of the 
Constitution, is read so broadly as to permit Congress to command individuals how and when 
they are to spend their after-tax income, individuals will be forever  relegated and demeaned as 
mere economic slaves to the Congressional Will.  If the Commerce Clause, or any other 
provision of the Constitution, is to be interpreted so broadly as to permit Congress to dictate how 
individuals may spend their economic resources, any pretense of a federal government possessed 
of enumerated power is rendered a historic nullity and individual liberty a mere temporal 
dispensation against the ever-present specter of a federal government possessed with the 
awesome power to destroy and bankrupt any individual by re-directing private economic wealth 
to Congress’ favored recipients. 
 The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl.3.  
The Court has developed a three-pronged analysis to determine is a federal law is properly 
within Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. 
  1. The Court’s Three-Prong Commerce Clause Analysis 
 In Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), and more recently in United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court defined the outer limits of congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause.  In Lopez, the Court observed that modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
“identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce 
power.”  Lopez at 558 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., Inc., 452 
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U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981); Perez at 150).  “First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of 
interstate commerce.”  Lopez at 558 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 256 (1964); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)).  “Second, Congress is 
empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or 
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.”  
Lopez at 558 (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern R. Co. v. United 
States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911); Perez at 150).  “Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the 
power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, …i.e., 
those activities that substantially affect commerce.”  Lopez at 558-59 (citing NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).  The Court in Lopez emphasized that even under 
the Court’s modern expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress’ regulatory 
authority is not without effective bounds.  Lopez at 557. 
 The decision in Lopez focused on the noneconomic conduct at issue in that case.  “The Act 
[does not] regulat[e] a commercial activity.  Id. at 580.  “Even under Wickard [v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111 (1942)], which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority 
over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a 
school zone does not.”  Id. at 566.  “The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense 
an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of 
interstate commerce.”  Id. at 573-74.  “Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation 
of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of 
commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would 
blur.”  The Lopez Court further explained: 
Unlike the earlier cases to come before the Court here neither the actors nor their conduct 
has a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute has an 
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evident commercial nexus.  The statute makes the simple possession of a gun within 
1,000 feet of the grounds of the school a criminal offense.  In a sense any conduct in this 
interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we 
have not yet said the commerce power may reach so far. 
 
Id. at 559-60. 
 
 It is clearly established by the Court’s Commerce Clause analysis that only economic 
conduct (not just mere conduct) is necessary to trigger Congress’ Commerce Clause powers.  In 
Wickard, the Court held an expansive regulatory scheme was permissible under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate local farmers because their affirmative economic conduct could have an 
adverse impact on the scheme’s price control mechanism.  Similarly, in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1 (2005), the Court held home-grown, medical marijuana was properly within the scope of 
Congress’ Commerce Clause powers because some of the product might enter the interstate 
market for illicit drugs.  Further, neither Wickard nor Raich suggests that that non-conduct is 
sufficient to trigger congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 
 In contrast to the economic conduct of Wickard and Raich, when the conduct targeted is not, 
in the first instance commercial in nature, the Court has routinely held a lack of congressional 
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.  In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000), the Court invalidated a federal statute directed at violent gender related crimes.   And in 
Lopez, the Court invalidated a portion of the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, on the basis 
that mere possession of a commercial product was not economic conduct.  Defendants do not 
distinguish application of the facts in Lopez from the facts of the instant action.  If Congress 
cannot under its Commerce Clause authority prevent an individual from possessing a physical 
object which at least arguably is the product of interstate commerce (a gun) within certain 
designated territorial areas of the United States (school zones), how does Congress posses 
Commerce Clause authority to regulate all individuals within any territory of the United States 
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precisely because they do not posses an article sold in interstate commerce (health insurance)?  
The facts in Lopez are arguably more clearly within the ambit of congressional Commerce 
Clause authority than the facts giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims because in Lopez Congress could 
at least point to a gun presumably obtained in interstate commerce, as compared to the instant 
case where Defendants cannot show any conduct on the part of Plaintiffs, let alone economic 
conduct, related to interstate commerce.  
 Despite some uneven jurisprudence on the outer limits of Congress’ Commerce Clause 
powers, one point is black-letter law – Every Commerce Clause decision expressly holds that 
congressional power is limited to the regulation of some kind of proactive, voluntary and 
affirmative economic conduct.   Plaintiffs’ lack of conduct, let alone economic conduct, is 
insufficient to trigger congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. 
  2. Individual Mandate Fails Court’s Three-Prong Commerce Clause  
   Analysis – Plaintiffs’ Are Not Engaged In Economic Conduct 
 
 Plaintiffs’ decision not to purchase health care insurance fails the Court’s three-prong 
Commerce Clause analysis.  Plaintiffs are not a “channel of interstate commerce.”  Id. at 558.  
Plaintiffs are also not “instrumentalities of interstate commerce” or a “person…in interstate 
commerce.”  Id.  And, Plaintiffs’ decision not to purchase health care insurance is not an activity 
“having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.”  Id. at 558-59.  Quite simply, inaction is 
not commercial activity subject to Congress’ Commerce Clause power to regulate.   
 Owing to clear jurisprudence that the Commerce Clause only reaches economic conduct, 
Defendants are forced to argue that Plaintiffs’ non-activity amounts to “economic activity.” 
Defendants posit that Plaintiffs’ decision not to purchase health insurance is a species of 
economic activity.  Defendants’ argue that when Plaintiffs sit at home and do not engage in 
economic activity, Plaintiffs are in reality engaging in precisely the economic activity in which 
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they have refused to engage.  Defendants’ argument is frankly Orwellian and smacks 
approvingly that citizens are mere economic pawns ripe to serve grand congressional socialistic 
policy gambits.   
 Aside from the fact that Defendants’ attempt to couch Plaintiffs’ non-activity as “economic 
activity” is patently absurd; Defendants argument fails for another important and discrete reason.  
Defendants’ argument is premised on the notion that the Commerce Clause permits Congress to 
regulate anyone who is a consumer (or in Plaintiffs’ case a non-consumer) of products offered in 
interstate commerce.  That is simply a false argument.  The history of Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence admits that Congress may regulate those who offer products and services that have 
an impact, in the aggregate, on interstate commerce.  However, no court has ever held that 
consumers become objects of congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause merely 
because they have purchased a product or service in interstate commerce.  Consumers of 
interstate goods and services are not engaged in conduct subjecting them to congressional 
regulation.   
 For instance, the wheat grower in Wickard, was subject to congressional regulation under the 
Commerce Clause because he took the affirmative step to grow wheat and other farm products 
for local sale.  The consumers of Mr. Wickard’s farm products, however, were not subject to 
Commerce Clause regulation.  The owner of the hotel in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. was subject 
to Commerce Clause regulation because the motel offered a service to interstate travelers.  The 
patrons and consumers of the motel’s services are not subject to congressional regulation simply 
because they rented a room at a motel for the evening. 
  Even if Plaintiffs, at some point in the future, become consumers of health care services or 
decide to purchase health care insurance, their conduct does not fit within the three-prong 
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analysis for congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause.  Therefore, Defendants’ 
extreme characterization of Plaintiffs’ decision not to purchase health care insurance as an 
economic act is fatally flawed because all Defendants’ are saying is that the decision not to be a 
consumer is the “economic act” not to be a consumer.  But the act of being or not being a 
consumer has never been held to constitute economic conduct sufficient to trigger congressional 
regulation under the Commerce Clause.  Otherwise, every citizen would be subject to federal 
regulation for every purchase of the most basic staples of life – a social calculus which harkens 
far beyond Orwellian prose but, rather, to some of the darkest passages of the Book of 
Revelation and the Beast’s control over all commerce. 
 Further, Defendants’ extended argument that Plaintiffs’ decision not to purchase health care 
insurance is some species of conduct impacting the interstate health care market is far too 
attenuated to survive judicial scrutiny.  Defendants posit that Plaintiffs’ decision not to purchase 
health care insurance will lead to: (1) future use of the health care system; and (2) burden the 
health care market by either not paying or paying below market rates.  First, there is no evidence 
that Plaintiffs’ decision will burden the health care market.  Such argument is the stuff of 
political spin to advance a narrow agenda, and one, in this case, rendered false by Plaintiffs’ past 
conduct.  Since dropping their health care insurance in 2001, all of Plaintiffs’ medical expenses 
have been paid in full.  See Compl. ¶43.  
 Health insurance is a mere tool, employed by many, to cover medial expenses.  It is certainly 
not the only legitimate method to plan for future medical expenses.  Personal savings, family 
assistance, and even extended community medical pools are legitimate replacements and viable 
alternatives to health care insurance purchased from for-profit corporations.  Furthermore, 
millions of temporarily uninsured individuals represent the least likely members of the 
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population to enter the health care market.  Many millions of healthy American in their twenties 
and thirties understandably choose not to purchase health care insurance because: (1) they are 
least likely to become ill; and (2) at that stage of life limited economic resources are better 
allocated toward education, professional training, and/or the purchase of a home and/or other 
costs associated with starting a new family.  In fact, it is because this group of Americans, by and 
large, do not become ill (and rationally decide not to purchase health care insurance) that the 
industry and the federal government salivate over their collective wallets and want to force them 
into the health care insurance market – the insurance industry and government both lust after 
them for increased profits and/or to redirect their economic resources to pay for the health care 
costs of older Americans. 
 Defendants’ extended argument that Plaintiffs’ choice not to buy health insurance implicates 
economic conduct is the sort of inference upon inference rejected by the Supreme Court in Lopez 
at 567-68 (“To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon 
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”)  Failure to purchase health 
care insurance does not implicate a free-loader status without some other quantum of evidence 
which Defendants cannot (and have not) supplied.   
 A lack of health insurance only implicates a burden on the health care market if all of the 
following chain of events become true (and none of which necessarily follow solely from being 
uninsured): (1) an uninsured individual becomes ill; (2) the illness requires medical attention; (3) 
the individual seeks and obtains medical attention; (4) the individual receives an invoice for 
medical services rendered; (5) the uninsured individual has not made plans for an unexpected 
illness or cannot access other assets to satisfy his/her medical bills; and (6) cannot or will not pay 
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his/her medical bill.  A modified version of this inferential chain can also be equally applied to 
any individual who has obtained health care insurance but finds out his/her illness and/or 
treatment is not covered by the insured’s insurance plan, or the illness and/or treatment exceeds a 
policy’s limit placed on coverage, or the insured cannot afford the deductible, or the insurance 
company refuses to pay a covered illness or treatment, or the insured’s illness is chronic and the 
insured’s insurance company either drops coverage or the insured’s rates are increased to the 
point where the insured cannot afford to continue to pay the monthly premiums and is forced to 
drop coverage.   
 All of which implicate those who have purchased health care insurance may also become a 
burden on the health care market.  All of which demonstrates the inferential chain sought to be 
applied to uninsured individuals is artificial and selective and directed solely at gaining access to 
their bank accounts.  The inference upon inference employed by Congress to justify the 
Individual Mandate is the kind of attenuated logic which does not support Commerce Clause 
regulation. 
 B.  The “Necessary And Proper Clause” Of The Constitution Does Not Boot-
   Strap Or Extend Congressional Power Under The “Commerce Clause” 
   To Permit Federal Regulation Of Individuals Not Engaged In Economic 
   Conduct, Or Any Conduct Whatsoever. 
 
  1. Defendants Seek to Expand Clause To Vest Congress With General  
   Police Powers 
 
 The Necessary and Proper Clause of the United States Constitution (hereinafter sometimes 
the “Clause”) does not expand congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
non-economic conduct unless and until the Commerce Clause is trigged, in the first instance, by 
economic conduct of some sort to which Congress has authority to regulate.  The Clause grants 
Congress broad authority to pass laws in furtherance of – not in addition to – constitutionally 
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enumerated powers.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  The Clause cannot operate independent of 
an enumerated power, and it does not create independent congressional power.  The Clause does 
not authorize Congress to exercise power in any way it deems convenient.  Consumer Energy 
Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
aff’d 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). 
 Furthermore, despite its broad grant of power to effectuate enumerated congressional powers, 
the Clause has never been interpreted to empower Congress to commandeer third party 
individuals to aid in the regulation of those who have placed themselves, through their own 
conduct, under congressional power.  At bottom, the fundamental concept rooted in every fiber 
of the Constitution militates that individual liberty trumps any notion that the Constitution 
empowers Congress to devise sweeping schemes to reorder society by imposing direct mandates 
on individuals not otherwise engaged in any conduct implicating exercise of Congress’ 
enumerated powers.  For instance, the Clause extends congressional power to establish post 
offices and post roads to permit Congress to punish those who steal letters from the post office, 
or use the postal system to engage in fraud.  See e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 417 
(1819).   
 By way of further example, in Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004), the Court 
explained “Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate federal moneys” 
and that it therefore “has corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to see 
to it that taxpayer dollars” are not “siphoned off” by “corrupt public officers.” Id. at 605.  The 
Court further explained Congress has the further prophylactic power to criminalize bribes and 
kickbacks even when the stolen funds have not been “traceable skimmed from specific federal 
payments.”  Id.  In United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343 (1879), the Court held the Clause extended 
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congressional power to declare war to award “pensions to the wounded and disabled” soldiers of 
the military and their dependents, and the further implied power “to pass laws to…punish” 
anyone who fraudulently appropriated such pensions.  Id. at 346; see also, Stewart v. Kahn, 11 
Wall, 493, 506-07 (1871).  All of the foregoing authority extended under the Clause implicates 
an individual engaged in conduct intersecting with an enumerated congressional power.  With 
the exception of the power to raise and support an army, Congress lacks authority over any 
individual unless and until that individual engages in contact which implicates or interferes with 
an enumerated power.  The Clause does not empower Congress to dragoon an individual outside 
of its enumerated jurisdiction and force them, on pain of criminal sanction, to engage in conduct 
Congress deems beneficial in exercise of its authority. 
 Most recently in United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 176 L.Ed.2d 878, 78 USLW 
4412 (2010), the Supreme Court clearly articulated that the Clause does not create a general 
police power in the federal government.  Justice Breyer writing for the Court stated:  
Nor need we fear that our holding today confers on Congress a general “police power, 
which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States.” United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).  As the Solicitor General repeatedly 
confirmed at oral argument, § 4284 is narrow in scope.  It has been applied to only a 
small fraction of federal prisoners.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24-25 (105 individuals have been 
subject to § 4284 out of over 188,000 inmates)….And its reach is limited to individuals 
already “in the custody of the” Federal Government.  § 4284(a); Tr. of Oral Arg. 7 
(“[Federal authority for § 4284] has always depended on the fact of Federal custody, on 
the fact that this person has entered the criminal justice system…”).  Indeed, the Solicitor 
General argues that “the Federal Government would not have…the power to commit a 
person who…has been released from prison and whose period of supervised release is 
also completed.”  Id., at 9.  Thus, far from a “general police power,” § 4284 is a 
reasonably adapted and narrowly tailored means of pursuing the Government’s legitimate 
interest as a federal custodian in the responsible administration of its prison system. 
 
Comstock at 1964-65.  In Comstock, the Clause provided sufficient authority to subject federal 
inmates to further detention because, in the first instance, the inmate had engaged in conduct 
which placed the inmate in federal custody. The Court’s analysis in Comstock demonstrates that 
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the Clause has never been applied to individuals who first did not engage in voluntary conduct 
triggering federal regulation under an enumerated power. 
  2. Plaintiffs Are Not The Proper Subject of Congress’ Regulation Of The 
   Health Care Insurance Industry 
   
 The Individual Mandate was not passed by Congress as some subsidiary mechanism to 
merely assist the beneficial exercise of other provisions of the Act properly within the sphere of 
Congressional regulation.  See e.g., McCullock v. Maryland, at 413, 418 (1819).  In fact, other 
provisions of the Act create sweeping regulatory schemes to aid and support the Individual 
Mandate.  See e.g., Act, § 1502 (starting in 2011 the Act mandates that employers are required to 
report the value of employer-provided health care coverage on an employee’s W-2 form to aid 
the government to track violations of the Individual Mandate).     
 The Individual Mandate forces healthy individuals (mostly in their 20’s and 30’s) into the 
health care market to purchase private health care insurance from for-profit health insurance 
providers.  At bottom, the Individual Mandate is a political and financial pay-off to private health 
care providers who will reap vast additional profit from the forced tribute of millions of healthy 
individuals who are less likely to claim benefits under their health care policies than older 
Americans.  Under section 1501(a)(2(G) of the Act, Congress proclaims: 
Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health Service Act (as added by section 
1201 of this Act), if there were no requirement, many individuals would wait to purchase 
health insurance until they needed care.  By significantly increasing health insurance 
coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will minimize 
this adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy 
individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums.  The requirement is essential to 
creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health products that are 
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold. 
 
 Congress may properly regulate corporate interests engaged in the sale of private health 
insurance under the Commerce Clause.  Congress can (presumably) mandate (subject to Fifth 
 32
Amendment Takings Clause restrictions) that those who sell private health insurance may not 
discriminate against applicants with pre-existing medical conditions.  In furtherance of this 
regulatory scheme, Congress may, pursuant to the Clause, regulate the industry to ensure that the 
pre-existing condition mandate is properly enforced.  Further, Congress may, pursuant to its 
taxing and spending powers raise and allocate funds in support of this mandate.  Plaintiffs, 
however, have not engaged in any conduct implicating or impairing the ability of Congress to 
impose the pre-existing condition mandate on the health insurance industry.   
 The question, then, is whether Congress has the power under the Clause to require 
individuals not engaged in any commercial conduct, and therefore not otherwise subject to 
Commerce Clause regulation, to purchase private health insurance to help compensate health 
insurance providers for the pre-existing condition mandate to which health insurance providers 
have subjected themselves to as a result of their commercial conduct.  If the answer to this 
question is “yes” citizens are now mere economic slaves to the federal government, and the 
entire corpus of their bank accounts may be delegated, at will, by congressional fiat without the 
need for Congress to exercise its powers under the General Welfare Clause and the concomitant 
political accountability exercise of such power entails.  Thankfully, to date, no court has ever 
answered this question in the affirmative. 
 The Constitution does not sanction some vague utopian (or dystopian) notion of a “shared 
responsibility” proclaimed by the Individual Mandate.  The Constitution protects individual 
liberty and rights against a collectivist approach more common to European social democracies.  
The alleged desire to improve health care in the United States and the regulatory scheme signed 
into law in support thereof, is insufficient to reverse or subsume the rights of the individual, not 
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engaged in any conduct implicating or threatening congressional power, to be left alone to 
determine, for himself/herself the allocation of after-tax earnings. 
  3. Individual Mandate Fails Court’s Five-Prong Necessary and Proper  
   Clause Analysis Announced in United States v. Comstock 
 
 The facts of United States v. Comstock, once again, admit that the Clause operates against 
those who have voluntarily engaged in conduct intersecting an enumerated power granted to 
Congress by the Constitution.  In Comstock, the Court held the Clause supported Congress’ 
regulatory scheme authorizing a district court to order any person previously convicted of a 
federal crime, and under the custody of the federal government, to remain under federal custody 
and control at the conclusion of a criminal sentence is the inmate is determined by the court to be 
either a sexual predator or danger to others. See Comstock at 1954.  Comstock, therefore 
expressly deals with what is “necessary and proper” for Congress to deal with a federal inmate 
who has first voluntarily engaged in criminal conduct.  As noted in Section III B(1) above, 
Justice Breyer specifically approved of the Solicitor General’s position that the federal 
government’s constitutional authority over an individual is solely dependent on the fact that the 
individual had already engaged in conduct subjecting him to federal authority.  Id. at 1964-65. 
 The Court in Comstock articulated a five-prong analysis to determine the extent of 
congressional authority under the Clause.  “We take these five considerations together.  They 
include: (1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause; (2) the long history of federal 
involvement in this arena; (3) the sound reasons for the statute’s enactment…; (4) the statute’s 
accommodation of state interests; and (5) the statute’s narrow scope.  Id. at 1965. 
 The five-prong analysis used in Comstock, if applied to the Individual Mandate, clearly 
admits the Individual Mandate exceeds congressional authority even under the Clause.  First, the 
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Clause has never extended congressional power over an individual not engaged in voluntary 
conduct implicating an enumerated power of Congress.   
 Second, there is no long history of the federal government regulating health care insurance.  
Heretofore, the regulation of health care insurance has been confined to the states.  And, once 
again, Congress has never attempted to impose a federal mandate compelling individual conduct 
beyond the express power granted to Congress to raise and support an army.   
 Third, the scope of the Individual Mandate is not limited in scope.  Every citizen and legal 
resident is subject to the Individual Mandate.  The Individual Mandate is a broad and clumsy 
legislative enactment which conscripts the entire population in service of its stated purpose.  
Instead of enacting a limited legislative or regulatory scheme confined to those individuals who 
demonstrate an inability to satisfy medical expenses through Congress’ taxing and spending 
powers, the Individual Mandate reaches into the homes of countless millions of Americans and 
seeks to compel affirmative economic conduct in the very area the Act seeks to regulate.  The 
Individual Mandate is one of, if not the single most, expansive exercise of federal power – ever. 
C.  The “General Welfare Clause” Of The Constitution Does Not Empower  
  Congress to Enact The Individual Mandate of the Act.   
 
 For the same reason the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply to Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendants’ 
argument that the Individual Mandate is a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the General 
Welfare Clause of the Constitution is inapplicable.  The General Welfare Clause is a broad grant 
of power permitting Congress to tax and spend for the general (as opposed to specific) welfare of 
the public. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  Plaintiffs concede (assuming such a scheme does not 
violate other Constitutional provisions) that Congress could have properly decided to impose 
new and/or higher taxes to fund an expansive federal program to either: (1) augment; or (2) take 
over complete responsibility for the United States health care system.  Such an exercise is within 
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congressional authority under the General Welfare Clause.  Congress, however, did not exercise 
its power under the General Welfare Clause because Congress did not have enough votes to 
support such a wide-ranging scheme.  Congress did not have the votes to raise taxes or impose a 
direct takeover of the health care system.  The Individual Mandate scheme is a direct result of 
Congress’ inability to exercise its authority under the General Welfare Clause.  
 The Individual Mandate is not a tax.  The Individual Mandate does not generate any funds to 
be assessed and collected by the federal government.  The Individual Mandate requires Plaintiffs 
to purchase a minimum level of health insurance from private health insurance providers starting 
in 2014.  The Individual Mandate directs Plaintiffs to send money to private enterprise – not to 
the government.  “A tax, in the general understanding of the term, and as used in the 
Constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the government.  The word has never been 
thought to connote the expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of another.”  
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1936).  The General Welfare Clause: 
confers upon the Congress power ‘to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, 
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United 
States….’ The government concedes that the phrase ‘to provide for the general welfare’ 
qualifies the power ‘to lay and collect taxes.  The view that the clause grants power to 
provide for the general welfare, independently of the taxing power, has never been 
authoritatively accepted. 
 
Id. at 64. 
 
 Those provisions of the Act which do impose a tax are unrelated to the Individual Mandate.  
For instance, new taxes on the tanning industry bear no relation to Plaintiffs’ responsibility to 
purchase health care insurance in 2014.  Revenue raised by this, or any other tax included in the 
Act, are unrelated to the scheme imposed by the Individual Mandate. 
 Further, no federal funds are expended on behalf of the Individual Mandate.  Again, it is 
Plaintiffs’ who are required to appropriate their funds to send to private health care providers, not 
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the federal government.  Plaintiffs receive nothing in return from the federal government in 
exchange for their intended compliance with the Individual Mandate. 
 Accordingly, the General Welfare Clause does not provide congressional authority for the 
Individual Mandate. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For all the foregoing reason, and in defense of the fundamental liberty of the American 
People, Defendants’ motion to dismiss must be denied. 
 
      Respectfully submitted, 
 
Date: July 26, 2010   ______/s/ Paul A. Rossi_______________  
      Paul A. Rossi, Esq. 
      Counsel for Plaintiffs 
      PA I.D. #84947 
      316 Hill Street 
      Mountville, PA  17554 
      (O) 717.285.2858 
      (C) 717.615.2030 
      panthonyrossi@comcast.net 
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U.S. Department of Justice 
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Washington, DC 20530 
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Dated: July 26, 2010    ____/s/ Paul A. Rossi________________ 
       Paul A. Rossi, Esq. 
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CERTIFICATION 
 I Paul A. Rossi, counsel to Plaintiffs, hereby certify that the foregoing Plaintiffs’ Brief in 
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is 9,159 words in length.  I further certify that I 
used the word-count function on Microsoft XP Professional Office, Word 2003, to determine the 
exact word-count of the foregoing brief. 
 
       ____/s/ Paul A. Rossi____________________ 
Dated:  July 26, 2010    Paul A. Rossi, Esq. 
       Counsel for Plaintiffs 
       PA #84947 
       316 Hill Street 
       Mountville, PA  17554 
       Office: 717.285.2858 
       Cell:    717.615.2030 
       Email: panthonyrossi@comcast.net 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
